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ABSTRACT
Thispaper presents calculations of the utility cost to consumers of
following alternative decision rules in the environments specified by tests
of the intertemporal allocation of consumption on aggregate data. The
alternatives include excess and inadequate sensitivity to income and interest
rate changes and ignoring information. The calculations find that the costs
of large deviations from the optimal decision rule- -consumptionequal to
current income, for example--are on the order oflc to $1 per quarter. They
are interpreted to suggest that the theory does not make predictions that are
robust to small inaccuracies of modelling, including small costs of
transactions and information, and that those small costs can account for
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The theory of the intertemporal allocation of consumption is at the
heart of macroeconomics and finance. Many studies have tested the theory
using aggregate data, in particular as tests of the permanent income
hypothesis and the consumption based capital asset pricing model, and they
often reject the versions of the theory that they specify. However, it's not
clear whether these statistical rejections imply a robust rejection of the
basic theory (in favor of. say, "liquidity constraints") or whether they are
driven by the many simplifying assumptions of tractable and empirically
useful models. The tests have also been criticized (among other reasons) for
exploiting "too fine" predictions of the theory, for example that all
individuals adjust their consumption on a weekly or monthly basis in response
to changes in prospective returns on the stock market.
As one way to address and quantify these doubts, this paper presents
calculations of the utility cost to consumers of following alternative
decision rules in the environments specified by the tests. For example, one
calculation finds the utility loss suffered by an individual who sets
consumption equal to income in each period rather than following the optimal
decision rule specified by the permanent income hypothesis in the environment
of Flavin's (1981) test.
1These utility costs are typically lOc to $1 per quarter (or 30 to 300
per month), that is,a steady stream of 100 to $1 per quarter would
compensate the consumer for the utility loss he incurs by following the
alternative decision rule.The utility costs are small because cyclical
changes in consumption are small and because the utility costs of deviations
from an optimum are an order of magnitude smaller than the deviation itself.
For example, the standard deviation of the growth rate of quarterly real per
capita nondurable consumption in postwar US data is 0.86 percentage points,
and its level in 1986 was about $3500 per year, implying a change of about
$7.50 each quarter. Now suppose the representative consumer makes a mistake,
and consumes $7.50 too little this quarter and (l+r) x $7.50 too much next
quarter, thereby washing out the phenomenon of cyclical consumption changes.
A simple calculation given below shows that this "mistake" implies at most a
6.50 utility loss if the consumer's relative risk aversion coefficient is 1
and a 650 utility loss if his relative risk aversion coefficient is 10.
Why do we care about the utility costs of alternative decision rules?
Suboptimal decision rules that cost a trivial amount of utility or profit are
called near-rational. Near-rational behavior can be mosteasily interpreted
as small mistakes: people don't literally maximize, they follow heuristic
decision processes that we model by maximization. Their actual decisionsmay
deviate from the optimal decision rules if the utility costs ofdoing so are
trivial.Using this interpretation, Akerlof and Yellen (l985a, 1985b and
1987) argued for the principle that the predictions of a theory should be
2robust to near-rational behavior, and Akerlof (1979) applied this idea in the
same way as in this paper to show that large deviations form optimal money
holdings carry trivial costs.
In a second interpretation, the small mistakes are made by economists in
modelling the world rather than by the agents we study. Empirically useful
forms of economic theory gloss over many complexities of the decision problem
that consumers actually face. There are small costs of transactions,
information acquisition, decision,attention,etc., as well asthe
(hopefully) small effects of modelling simplifications to one consumption
good, known forms for the distributions of stochastic processes, simple
depreciation schedules for durable goods, etc. We can't know precisely what
effect including these small corrections would have on the predictions of the
theory until we work out a theory that includes them, but we can use the
range of alternate decision rules that cost the consumer (say) $1 per quarter
of utility as a guide to the range of behavior we might expect the theory to
predict if a small (fixed) cost of $1 per quarter were properly included.
More precisely, suppose we calculate the achieved level of utility as a
function of decision rule parameters.Then we can use this (indirect)
utility function to measure the economic power, just as we use the likelyhood
funâtion to measure its statistical power. The range of alternative decision
rule parameters that generate utility within (say) $1 of the optimum is the
range against which the theory has little economic power, just as the range
of alternative decision rule parameters within a given fraction of the
3maximum likelihood is the range against which the theory has little
statistical power.
it may happen that a test can statistically reject the optimal decision
rule in favor of alternatives with small utility costs, or that the
likelihood function is more curved than the utility function. This situation
indicates that a statistical rejection might be driven by modelling
simplifications rather than by a failure of the basic theory.Though
macroeconomics is often accused of not having enough data to statistically
reject any model, such a situation indicates the opposite: that tests are
ableto statistically distinguish alternativesthat are not well
distinguished economically.
One limitation of this interpretation of utility loss calculations is
that we should not expect near-rational decision rules to persist if there
are institutions that can remove them. For example, consumers might be able
to sign over their income streams to a firm, which then makes their
consumption decisions for them and collects the surpluses available from
reducing many consumers' small mistakes, or from reducing their small
information costs if there are increasing returns in the activities
corresponding to those costs.Pension plans, Christmas clubs, and mutual
funds may in part perform these services for the problems oflife-cycle and
intra-year consumption allocations and for portfolio decisions.However, I
know of no institutionsthat makecyclical allocationsforthe
consumer-changes in consumption in response to changes in aggregate income or
4rates of retuxn-which is the focus of the empirical literature and of this
paper.
For this reason, propositions derived from dynamic optimization by firms
alone1 may be less sensitive to near-rational criticism.A suboptimal
decision that costs IBM .1% of its profits is a small mistake from the firm's
viewpoint, but quite valuable to a manager if he can improve the decision and
capture some of the increased profit. Also, a firm that does not optimize
can be taken over by a better set of managers. But there is no analogy to the
market for corporate control at the level of the individual consumer.2
The body of this paper takes two approaches to argue that the range of
decision rules that cost less than about $1 per quarter is in fact large, and
encompasses alternative decision rules that are economically extreme and that
can account for statistical rejections in the environments of common tests of
the intertemporal allocation of consumption on aggregate data.Section 2
shows that first order deviations from an optimum carry only second order
utility losses, so there are always alternative decision rules for which the
ratio of utility losses to the magnitude of the deviation are as small as one
likes. Section 3 calculates the exact utility losses of following a variety
ofspecific alternative decision rules in environments that are typical of
tests in the empirical literature.
5L. klur Rationality and ft Intertemporal Allocation 2.L Consunrntion
One reason to suspect that the costs of alternative decision rules are
small is that first order "mistakes" in decisions have second order
consequences for utility, or that there are always decisions close to the
optimal one for which the ratio of utility losses to the deviation from the
optimum can be made as small as one wishes.These points have been most
recently popularized by Akerlof and Yellen in essentially static contexts.
This section extends them to the dynamic and stochastic case considered by
the theory of the intertemporal allocation of consumption.3
The basic idea is most simply expressed in the context of the
constrained maximization of a differentiable function f(a)




whereis a vector of choice variables. The first order conditions are
* M
(2.2) Df(a) —df(x)/dx —
where denotes an optiim andA are lAgrange multipliers.Consider a
deviation —+ ax, thatsatisfies the budget constraints, so m'aa —0
i—l, .. .Z1.The effect of this deviation on the objective is
(2.3) f() —f(*)÷ 1/2 t' D2f ax +O(1aa13)
In words, (1) feasible first order deviations in choice variables have second
order consequences. The definition of derivative and limit in (2.2) imply
that (2) there are suboptimal feasible choices x+ — ÷ax for which the
ratio of the size of the utility losses to the size of the deviation are as
6small as one wishes. Formally stated, for all c >0,there is a 6 such that
any A that satisfies the constraints ;'x —0i —12,.ii, and is smaller
than 6, 0 <aI< 8, has a ratio of utility losses to magnitude of deviation




A version of the second statement holds near rather than precisely at
the optimum: if f is twice differentiable, we can always choose a point near
the optimum and a deviation from that point so that the ratio of losses to
the deviation is arbitrarily small. This is shown in the appendix.
A simple and typical version of the consumer's problem is:
(2.5) max U((c0,c1, .. .)) — E $tu(c)
(c0,c1, ..1 t0
(2.6) s.t. 1) —ak+ -
t-l
2) lim (IIR1 )1. k —0a.s.
t-c1—0
3) k0 given
where c —consumption,y —anendowment stream, -'nonhumanwealth at the
beginning of period t(decisionsat time taffectk+1. not kt) and is the
ex-post real interest rate between time tandtime t+l (when stochastic, Rt
is not known until the beginning of t+l). The second constraint rules out
borrowing a dollar and rolling over the debt forever; it allows the period
to period budget constraint given in (2.6) to be written in present value
7form
t+l
(2.7) k0 —E (IIRY(c - a.s.
t—O t—l
Let s denote the state of the economy at date t.For example, s can
be a list of the current and past values of all relevant shocks. Then, the
the consumer chooses a consumption plan (c1(s1), c2(s2),
.. .) (thelist
extends over all dates and states) to maximize (2.5). The plan specifies how
much to consume at each date t in each possible state s at that date.4
When finitely many states can happen each period and the problem has
a finite horizon T, the consumption plan has a finite number of elements (one
for each date-state combination), and the budget constraint specifies a
terminal condition for each of a finite number of states at the last date, so
the consumer's dynamic, stochastic problem (2.5) -(2.6)is isomorphic to the




where the list extends over all dates and states.Equations (2.3) -(2.5)
apply directly, so (1) deviations to an alternate plan
++1 + 2 +T
(2.9) —(c1(s),c(s),... c,(s
have only second order effects on expected utility, and (2) there is always
analternateplanforwhich the ratio of losses to the deviation is as small
as one wishes, where "small" is defined with the Euclidean norm.
To make the same statements in an infinite-period or continuous-state
8context, in which the consumption plan has an infinite number of elements,
consider a deviation that satisfies the budget constraint. Let {c) and {c)
denote the optimal and alternative plans, where {c) satisfies the budget
constraints in (2.6) -(2.7).Define the difference between the two plans




Now consider suboptimal rules of the form c + aAc.If cis an
optimum and u is differentiable, we must have
d
(2.11)—.EEpt(*+ atc ) — Eflt?(*)A —0
t—0 a—U t—0
The familiar statement of the Euler equation follows from particular
choices for Act. For example, Ac —0,except Ac 1 at t in state s, and
—attime t+l in states following s yields
(2.12) u'(c) —fi E [ a u'(c+1)It]
(2.11) implies directly that (1) first order deviations c * that
respect the budget constraint have second order consequences. Alternately,
(2) there are suboptimaL consumption plans c .r aAc for which the ratip of
losses to deviations is as small as one wishes. Formally, the definition of
a derivative in (2.11) states that for any c > 0 there is an a > 0 such that
the ratio of losses to the size of the deviation, measured by a, is smaller






Theonly real difference between this statement and the corresponding one for
the finite date and state case is that the size of deviations is
measured by a, instead of by the Euclidean norm of (2.4).
This formulation differs slightly from that in Akerlof and Yellen
(1987). They consider a static maximizer whose objective was the one period
maximization f(x ar). They describe uncertainty by the evolution of a over
time, and their central result is that "inertial behavior"-not changing x in
response to a change in ahas second order effects.Here I consider an
intertemporal maximizer, and the central proposition is that plans {x) near
(x) have second order costs, which follows directly from the first order
conditions.
L.CalculationsfUtilityLosses
"Second order" does not necessarily mean small: 10062 is larger than
.Olc for a range of €.Thissection computes the actual utility costs of
some economically interesting alternatives.
Utility costs depend on the consumer's environment (how much income he
has, how variable that income is, and how rates of return vary over time), on
the consumer's preferences (how he values deviations), and on the alternative
10decision rules we consider. The environments, preferences andalternatives
in the empirical literature that tests the theoryof the intertemporal
allocation of consumption using aggregate data are similar, so there is some
hope that the calculations in typicalenvironments below are reasonable
approximations to the utility loss of a wide varietyof similar tests.
Many studies only test for misallocation ofnondurable consumption
($2,308 1982 dollars per capita in 1947, $3,484 in 1985), but they usebroad
definitions of income, up to and including CM? ($7,330 1982 dollars per
capita in 1947, $14,823 in 1985). If we specify the timeseries process for
income and ask the consumer for the optimal level of consumption in a model
like (2.5) -(2.6)we get a total consumption series, which averages about
the same value as the income series. To produce a consumption series whose
level is comparable to that of nondurable consumption, the calculations
assume an income process whose average value is $3,000 per year,and whose
time series properties are the sac as CNP (we can interpret this as a
constant fraction of aMP devoted to nondurable consumption). Utility costs
scale fairly well with income, so the costs in tests that use broader
consumption aggregates are easy to extrapolate from calculations that use
$3000 per year.
Host tests specify either a quadratic or constant relative risk aversion
utility function, and either specify or estimate a risk aversioncoefficient
between 1 and 10, and occasionally as high as 30.The calculations in this
paper use those utility functions.Other forms for the utility function
11could raise (or lower) the costs of deviations.5
The alternatives in each case are motivated by the alternatives that
typical tests have found in each environment. Sections 3.1-3.4 study
economically interesting alternatives, including excess sensitivity and
smoothness in the face of income shocks and slow reactions to changes in
interest rates. Section 3.5 studies the costs of tolerating predictable Euler
errors, which is typically the basis of statistical rejection.
3.1 A Simple Upper Bound
Considera small increase Ac in consumption at date t, balanced by
future reductions in consumption. By taking Ac as the standard deviation of
aggregate consumption, we will produce a cost per quarter of "mistakes" that
would swamp the variation in aggregate consumption, and hence void any
predictions the theory can make. This calculation can also be interpreted as
an upper bound for the costs of following "reasonable" alternate rules, since
alternatives cannot deviate from the optimum by much more than one standard
deviation if they hope to be a plausible description of the data.
By the first order conditions for optimization, this perturbation has no
first order effects.Its second order effects must be greater than the
second order effects of changing ct alone, which are
(3.1.1)AU a 1/2 u''(c) (Ac)2.
12Converting to dollars by dividing by the marginal utility of consumption,
AU
1 c u''(ct) Ac 1Ac








where y is the relative risk aversion Coefficient.
Equation (3.1.2) is a lower bound for the effects of the perturbation,
because it ignores the second order effects of the future changes in
consumption needed to restore the budget constraint.We can derive upper
bounds for the total effect of the perturbation by considering specific
patterns of future consumption change. For example, if the consumer
reestablishes the budget constraint at t÷l byAc+1 —RAc,the dollar
value of the change in utility due to the change at t+l is
AU 1 fiu"(c1)(Ac+1)21 Ac
(3.1.3) a— a _7_Act
u'(ct)
2 u'(c) 2
where the last approximation is for a 1/fl and near 1, and ct a The
change in utility from the total perturbation is less than the sum of the
second order effects due to the change at time t, (3.1.2), and the change at
time t+l, (3.l.3):6
1 Ac AU Ac (3.1.4) —7Act —
Act 2 c u'(c) c
This equation captures much of the intuition of the calculations that
follow: even if "mistakes" Ac are as large as the standard deviation of
13consumption, that standard deviation is on the orderof $10 per capita and
Ac/c is about 1%, so utility costs are less than iocwith risk aversion i—
andless than $1 with y— 10.
Table 1 presents some evaluations of equation (3.1.4). There is a body
of evidence that nondurable consumption is essentially a random walk (see
Campbell and Deaton (1987) or Cochrane and Sbordone (1988)), so table 1takes
Ac/c as the standard deviation of quarterly growth rates of nondurable per
capita consumption, and c as its level in 1947 and 1985. The utility losses
range from 4C to $1.94 per quarter for values ofthe risk aversion
coefficient y between 1 and 30.
The essence of these calculations can also be found (in a completely
different context) in Lucas (1987). Lucas calculated that the utility gain
available from eliminating "cycles" in consumption was small compared to
increases in the "trend", which implies that the utility costs of
"misbehaving" over the cycle are similarly small.
3.2. "ExcessSensitivity" and "Excess Smoothness" Tests of the Permanent
Income Rypo thesis
FollowingFlavin (1981), consider an environment designed to represent
detrended time series. Labor income is treated as an endowment, and is given
exogenously by
14(3.2.1) —(l-p)3+ fl1+ i.i.d,E(c) —0,var(c)—2
Theconsumer maximizes a quadratic utility function
(3.2.2) U —-1/2Efit (c -
Hecan borrow and lend freely at a constant interest rate a —(1+r)equal to
the discount rate, fi— 1/(1+r),sothe period to period budget constraint is
(3.2.3) ki —(l+r)k +y
-c;lime k+1 —0a.s.
where k is accumulated capital or nonhuman wealth. The consumer's optimal
decisionrule is7
(3.2.4) c —nc+rflfrE(y4) tt
—0 -'
Forthe AR(l) income process (.2.1), this decision rule becomes
(3.2.5) ct —rk+÷m (y ) m'—l+r-p
In summary,wecan characterize the evolution of optimal consumption
over timeby the system
(3.2.6) —(l-p)j'+'t-l +
* * —*
—rk+y + in (y-y)




(The asterisks on consumption and capital stock distinguish them from
suboptimal versions that follow.)
Flavin and following authors aimedtheir tests at the alternative
15hypothesis that consumption is too sensitive to current income y. We can
generate "excessively sensitive" consumption with decision rules with higher
than optimum marginal propensities to consume
(3.2.7) —(l-p)5r+ +
+ + — + — rk÷y+m(y-y)





These alternate decision rules respect the budget constraints. By




From(3.2.8) and the assumption that the present value of income is finite,
it follows that lim —a
Inthismodel itispossible to calculate the level of expected utility
the consumer achieves by following any decision rule of the form (3.2.7).
The calculation is presented in the appendix. The result is that the loss of
time0 expected utility (AU) suffered by a consumer who follows marginal
propensity Cinsteadof the optimal m* is
(l+r)2 c ÷ *2 (3.2.9) AU—
2(in-in)
2r (l+r-p)
16To convert this time 0 utility loss to dollars per quarter (the
perpetuity of x dollars each quarter that would compensate the suboptimizing
consumer), divide the utility loss by the marginal utility of a dollar at
time 0,u'() —- y),and multiply by r, since an additional dollar of
income at every date is worth hr dollars of extra capital stock at time 0:
r AU (l+r)2c2 (IC -
(3.2.10) dollar/quarter loss — -
—
2 — —
u'(y) 2 (l+r-p )(c-y)
Another measure of the utility loss is the dollar value of the time 0 utility
loss as a fraction of the present value of the consumer's income stream,





AU (l+r)2o2 (m -m*)2
(3.2.12) time 0 dollar loss /pv—
—
— — — —
u'(y).pv 2 (1+r-p )y(c -y)
The flow loss (3.2.10) divided by the expected value of the income flow y is
equal to the ratio of total loss to wealth (3.2.12). The present value of
income is $60,750 in the calculations that follow.
Table 2 presents some evaluations of utility losses, (3.2.10) and
(3.2.12).I used the following parameters, designed to evaluate a test using
aggregate nondurable consumption data: 1) the real interest rate is 5% per
year; 2) p—. 95 from an OLS autoregression of detrended quarterly per capita
17real GNP; 3) —$3000/year.conformable to the level of nondurable
consumption, as explained above; 4) a —$120/4x $3000/$l4000 —$6.43.C
fromthe ClIP autoregression was $120.I divided this by 4 quarters/year so
the units are quarterly consumption,and multiplied by nondurable
consumption/ClIP so the units are comparable to nondurable consumption.
5) Ic0 —0.Other k0 simply increase both the optimal and alternative
consumption by rk0 in each period.
Table 2 presents utility costs for several values of the bliss point :
$937.50, $1125, and $1500, or 5/4, 3/2, and 2 times initial income and
initial consumption of $750. The choice of bliss point has no effect on the
utility loss (3.2.9) because the utility function is quadratic,but it
affects the dollar value of that loss by changing the marginalutility of a
dollar.
The bliss point has not been a focus of empirical workas has the
coefficient of risk aversion, so it is less clear whatrange of values is
reasonable. Many studies do not report their estimated bliss point when it
is identifiable, and the implied bliss points ofmany studies are negative or
less than consumption (see Lewbel (1987)). Since quadratic utility is
usually justified as a local approximation to a more reasonableutility
function, we can assess how reasonable a bliss point is bycalculating the
local coefficient of relative risk aversion. This is
-cu"(c) c 1
(3.2.13) (c,) — —
—
—
— u'(c) (c-c) c/c -1
18so it is controlled by the ratio of the bliss point to consumption.This
formula is also the coefficient of risk aversion to time 0 gambles, defined
as (k +j/r)V''(k)/V'(k). This can be verified from the formula for the
value function V(k) in the appendix. Table 2 Includes a calculation of this
quantity for each choice of bliss point. Table 2 stops at a bliss point of
1.25 times initial consumption and initial income, corresponding to a
relative risk aversion coefficient of 4 at initial consumption. In
simulations of the model with lower bliss points (say, 1.1 times initial
consumption for y —10),consumption typically exceeded the bliss point
within a few periods,suggesting that the linear quadratic model
approximation is not useful in this range, because its results will depend
too heavily on past bliss point behavior.
The costs in table 2 are less than 65c per quarter, or .09% of time zero
wealth, and are mostly on the order of 1-bc per quarter or .01% of time 0
wealth. Figure 1 provides some intuition for the small size of the costs by
contrasting a simulation of too sensitive consumption (m+ —1)with the
optimal consumption path (m* —.2).I included the origin of the vertical
axis to emphasize that even with this extreme overreaction to current income,
the level of consumption is not that affected.Since the consumer values
deviations of the level of consumption from its optimal path, high frequency
deviations cost very little.
For comparison, Flavin's point estimate of the excess marginal
propensity was .355, so the corresponding costs are about those of the m —
19m*+.355 .6 row of Table 2, or between 2 and 9' per quarter and less than
.01% of time 0 income.9
Mankiw and Shapiro (1985). Campbell and Deaton (1987) and West (1988)
criticized Flavin and her followers for using detrended data rather than
assuming a process for income with a unit root. In the simplest case income
follows a pure random walk.
(3.2.14)
— +





Campbelland Deaton and West test models of this type and find that aggregate
consumption is "too smooth."
We could capture "excess smoothness" by the same kind of alternate
decision rules as in equation (3.2.7), with alternate marginal propensities
at< 1.However, this choice produces an alternative decision rule with
several undesirable properties when income follows a random walk.When
income y follows a stationary process.y stays near its unconditional mean
so variation in at in the decision rule ct —rk
++ m(y
-y)has a
bounded effect on consumption.When is a random walk, however,
-
getsunboundedly large, so varying athasa big effect on consumption.
Furthermore, since the spectral density of - y)is concentrated at low
frequencies, the excess smoothness that these decision rules capture is not
20the economically interesting higt frequency or period to period failure to
adjust, but a low frequency failure to adjust.
A way to capture excess smoothness that avoids these problems is to let






TableS presents the utility loss from following this "too smooth" decision
rule.Even when the consumer smooths the last ten years of income to
determine current consumption, the utility loss is less than $1.28 per
quarter. An explicit formula for the utility losses in this case is
algebraically complicated. The calculation of utility losses is detailed in
the appendix.
For comparison, Campbell and Deaton (table 6) report point estimates
for the ratio of the actual to predicted innovation variance of (Ac/y1)
between .456 with a standard error of .20 and .147 with a standard error of
.16, depending on which consumption variable they use and the number of
included lags. Under the long moving average alternative, the innovation in
Ac is y/(N+1), so the inverse of the square root of Campbell and Deaton's
ratios, between l// —1.48and l// —1.16,is roughly comparable to
(N+l). Hence, their finding of excess smoothness corresponds to a less than
one period moving average of income, and carries utility costs of .ic to 2.7c
per quarterJ°
213.3 Euler equation tests andsensitivityto interest rate changes.
The second major category of tests of the intertemporal allocation of
consumption are the Euler equation tests, following Hall (1979) and Hansen
and Singleton (1983).The first-order conditions or Euler equations for
maximization of the consumer's problem given in equations (2.5)-(2.6) are
(3.3.1) u'(c) —fi E[a u'(ct1) ]
Hence,if we define 6t÷l by
(3.3.2) log u'(c) —log + log u'(c+1) +
then E(S÷iItime t information) —0,which is the basis of tests.
Euler equation tests are often used to test optimal responses to
fluctuations in the conditional distribution of asset returns rather than
optimal adjustment to income changes (in part because the models usually
can't be solved for optimal adjustments to income).Hence, I examine the
alternative to (3.3.1) that consumers fail to take optimal account of
fluctuations in (real) rates of return.
To create a time-varying returns series, I generated quarterlyreal
interest rates by an AR(l),
(3.3.3) a —Pat1+ (t-p) +
I picked the mean interest rate—1+ .05/4 and its standard deviation
—.05/4to give a generous variation over time in interest rates.This
22variance is roughly the variance in ex-ante returns that Poterba and Summers
(1987) and Cochrane (1988b) argue is necessary to explain long horizon stock
market data; it is also about the same as the variance of ex-post real
interest rates. A lower variance of interest rates will give rise to less
variance in both optimal and alternate consumption paths, and so lower
utility costs.
I assume that consumers perfectly foresee the path of interest rates.
This makes the calculations simpler; by making only part of the variation
predictable we would again get less variance in optimal and alternate
consumption and lower costs.Then, the optimal consumption path satisfies
the Euler equation
(3.3.4) u'(c) —fi Ru'(c÷1)
With constant relative risk aversion utility u —(c1-l)/(1-),the Euler
equation is
(3.3.5) /c—(fi
Foran alternate decision rule, suppose consumers react slowly to
interestrate changes, by setting consumption growth proportional to a moving
average of past interest rates. Define the alternative consumption rule
by:





Table 4 presents evaluations of the cost of following this alternative
for various parameter values. I performed the calculations as follows: 1) I
generated an interest rate path for 200 quarters using equation (3.3.3) and
took a (l÷N)-period moving average of the interest rate, as in equation
* + (3.3.7);2) starting with c0 —c0
—$750/quarter,I generated optimal and
alternative consumption paths by (3.3.5) and (3.3.6);3) I multiplied the
alternative path by a constant, so that the present value of the optimal and
alternate paths is the same;4) I evaluated the achieved utility of the





5) I converted the utility losses to a dollar quarterly flow by dividing the
utility loss, AU —U-U,by the marginal utility of a time 0 dollar,
and by the present value of a constant one dollar flow, 1 +
[1JR1i. Tomaintain comparability, I used the same interest rate path for
each value of the parameters.The parameters are & —1.012per quarter
(corresponding to 1,05 per year), CR—.012(.05 annual) ,c0—$750 per
quarter ($3000/year). fi—14,and p— .841 (.5 annual
The costs in table 4 rise the longer the moving average of interest
rates used to define c+, and the costs are higher for more persistent
24interest rate movements. Both allow the alternate path to drift further away
from the optimal path. Raising the coefficient of risk aversion 'y lowers the
costs of deviating from the optimal path.This occurs because less risk
averse consumers adjust their consumption by greater amounts in response to
given interest rate changes.Perfectly risk neutral consumers would set
consumption to +weverytime C 1/fl and vice versa. The greater difference
between optimal and alternative consumption paths for less risk averse
consumers more than offsets the lesser value placed on these differences.
3.4Costs of ignoring information
Inmost studies, the strongest statistical evidence against the theory
comes from predictability of Euler equation errors, rather than from a
statistical rejection of the optimal decision rule in favor of a
well-specified alternative as above. Evidence that E(6÷1IXt) is not zero,
where is any variable observed at time t, is the basis for rejection of
the model.
But consumers may rightly ignore information variables if the utility
gained by using them to better adjust consumption does not outweigh the costs
of obtaining and processing the information.If this is so,evidence of
forecastability of Euler errors is not evidence against the basic theory of
intertemporal optimization, and the variable X loses its status as an
instrument.This section presents calculations of the utility costs of
tolerating such predictable Euler errors.
25Start with the upper bound derived in section 3.1, that the utility
costs resulting from a perturbation Ac are
AU Ac
(4.1.1) dollar loss — £ y_!Ac
u'(c) c
Now, suppose that the Euler error, —log(c1/c)-log(flR)in the CRRA
caseand 6t+l —ct+lctin the linear-quadratic case, is predictable using a
variable or vector of variables X. We can approximate the utility costs-how
much utility the consumer loses by not readjusting consumption in response to
the information variables XbY considering a perturbation from the optimum,
Ac in (4.1.1), equal to the standard error of the predictable change in
consumption.
In what follows, I'll consider the case of constant interest rates, so
that the standard deviation of consumption changes is equal to the standard
deviations of the Euler error 6t+1'(The standard deviation of forecastable
returns is typically about the same or less than that of consumption, so this
approximation is not misleading.)
Table S presents some evaluations of (4.1.1) for different values of the
predictability of consumption changes or growth rates, where an of 1.00
correposnds to the standard deviation of consumption changes ($6.43) from
table 1.The top four rows of table Sgive four different and equivalent
measures of the assumed predictability of returns for their column. The top
26row gives the ratio of the standard deviation of predictable consumption
growth or change to total consumption growth or change.The next row gives
the corresponding B? (the square of the top row).This is the of a
regression of consumption growth or change on the information variable
The third row gives the standard error of the predictable component in growth
rate units, and the fourth row in changes or dollar units. The table entries
are calculated by (4,1.1), with tc —thestandard error of predictable
change in dollars (fourth row) (or Ac/c —thestandard deviation of
predictable growth, third row), c —$300014and as given in the first
column. The entries are thus dollars per quarter utility losses from
tolerating the given predictability of consumption changes or growth rates.
Comparing to Table 1, the perturbations tc here are simply fractions of the
perturbations Ac in table 1.Since utility losses are proportional to
they are linear in the assumed of a regression, and are equal to
the losses of table 1 at an B?of1.00.
typical values for B?ofregressions that predict consumption growth or
changes are below .1.I know of no study that claims an above .2.The
column of table 5 with R2 —.25shows that tolerating this overall
predictability carries utility costs less than lC to l4 per quarter for
risk aversion -y 10, and 40C per quarter for the extreme of i— 30.The
predictability of consurapcton due to an individual variable is typically
smaller; if consumers ignore that variable and hence invalidate its use as an
instrument, their utility costs are determined by the R2 of that
varaible alone, and hence even lower than the lQ -l4Crange.
27._ ConcludinzRemarks
The calculations presented above suggest that in the majority of current
tests of the intertemporal allocation of consumption on aggregate data,
economically and statistically significant departures from •the optimal
decision rule have small utility costs, less than $1 per quarter or 30c per
month. This suggests that the theory of the intertemporal. allocation of
consumption, applied to a representative consumer with certain typical
preferences and used to explain aggregate phenomena in a period of mild
consumption volatility such as the postwar U.S. •doesnot generate
predictions of behavior that are robust to small misspecifications by
economists or small "mistakes" by consumers, in the sense that both
economically and statistically extreme alternatives (for example, consumption
proportional to income, or consumption growth that is predictable with an
of .25) carry trivial utility costs.
In particular, the utility costs of deviations from an optimal path
depend on the absolute deviation of the alternate path from the optimal path.
Hence, high frequency deviations like lagged responses, temporary misuse of
information, failure to adjust consumption immediately in response to the
information content of typical observable macro variables, and so forth, have
especially low utility costs. But it is the exact timing of the use of
information and the exact timing of consumption changes that has been the
focus of recent empirical work.
28These observations are both good and bad news for macroeconomic
applications of the theory.On one hand, they imply that the alternative
behavior that typical tests search for and alternative behavior that can
cause the tests to reject can be generated by small ($1 per quarter) costs of
information acquisition or processing, transactions, etc., so finding those
alternatives is not strong evidence against the basic theory that consumers
intertemporally optimize. On the other hand, it implies that the theory as
it stands provides few predictions about the relationship between aggregate
consumption and asset price or aggregate quantity fluctuations that are
robust to $1 "mistakes" or misspecifications.
These results are not a criticism of dynamic economic theory or its
empirical application in general.Dynamic optimization by fins may be
exempt because of fins' larger size and different structure. Studies of
consumption in microeconomic data sets, in which income and investment
opportunities show orders of magnitude greater variation over time and across
individuals than in aggregate data, may well escape the criticism of this
paper. Large utility costs could appear in studies that use aggregate data,
if they include nonstandard utility functions with at least two orders of
magnitude greater risk aversion, other freçuencies (life-cycle allocation
instead of cyclical allocation or period to period orthogonality), or data
sets from other times or countries with orders of magnitude greater
varaibility in consumption.If a theory departs from the representative
consumer setup of most current empirical work to a disaggregated framework in
which the cyclical variation in consumption is due to only a few people, the
29costs of misbehavior to those people may be high.
Nonetheless, the calculations and the existence of alternatives with
arbitrarily small ratios of costs to deviations presented in this paper
suggest that calculations such as these are a worthwhile robustness check in
these other environments as well.
30Table 1
Upper bound for utility loss from a perturbation Ac
Assumed c and Ac
Ac/cAc 5 10 30
.86% $5.00 4.3c 22c 43c$1.29
.86% $7.50 6.5032 650$1.94
Losses are computed as -y Ac/c Ac (see equation (3.1.4)). The assumed values
for c and Ac are motivated by the following (end —realnondurable
consumption per capita):
—standarddeviation of quarterly percent growth of cnd
—.86%x cnd per quarter in 1947 ($577)
—standarddeviation of cnd -cnd1
—.86%x $3000 per year /4
—.86%a cnd per quarter in 1986 ($871)








Utility Loss from Excess sensitivity
Bliss point and (risk aversion coefficient)
$937.50(4) $1125(2) $1500(1)
$/q $/pv $/q $/pv $/q $/pv
— 0.0 4.100.01%2.100.00%1.000.00%




int—1.0 65.700.09% 32.900.04% 16.400.02%
The column marked M$/qlt gives the dollar per quarter utility cost of
following the indicated marginal propensity to consume, or c —rk++
calculatedby equation (3.2.10). The column marked "$/pv" gives the
tine0dollar utility cost as a percent of the time 0 present value of
income, equation (3.2.12). The local risk aversion coefficient corresponding
to each bliss point is l/(a/c-1). The parameters are interest rate r —.012
(5 percent per year), AR(l) coefficient on income p —.95,standard error of
income AR(1) a.— $6.43, Initial —meanincome y0 —— $300014.The optimal




Utility Loss from "too smooth" consumption when income is a random walk
Bliss point and (risk aversion coefficient)
The entries in the table are the dollar perquarter utility loss and the
total utility loss /time0 value of income. Income isa random walk;
the optimal marginal propensity is 1, and the alternative is thatconsumption




Thecalculations are detailed in the Appendix.
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$937.50(4) $1125(2) $1500(1)







9.7Q .013% 4.9c.006% 2.4c .003%
24.0c .032%l2.0.016% 6.0c .008%
65.4 .087%32.7c.044% 16.3c .022%
$1.28 .170% 64.Oc.085% 32.0c .043%Table 4
Dollar loss /quarterfrom smoothing interest rates
Risk aversion i and Moving average of past interest rates
autocorrelation p 1 year 5 years 10 years
7—2 p—.841 5c 76C $1.45
-7—5 p—.81.l 2C 30c 56c
lc 15c 28
-r—5•i'—0 0 8 26
The entries are the dollar cost per quarter of using a moving average of
past interest rates in the place of the one period rate. To calculate the
entries 1 1) generated an interest rate path for 200 quarters and took an N+l
period moving average of the interest rate; 2) generated optimal and
alternative consumption paths;3)multiplied the alternative path by a
constant, so that the present value of theoptimal and alternatepaths is the
same; 4)evaluatedthe achieved utility of each consumption series; 5)
converted the utility losses to a dollar quarterly flow.I used the same
interestrate path for each entry. The parameters are—1.012per quarter
(1.05 per year), —.012(.05 annual) ,c0—$750/quarter ($3000/year) —
l/(l.012)or l/(l,05) annual. p —.841(corresponds to p—.5annual).
34TabI.e 5.
Utility costs of tolerating predictable Euler errors
Assumed predictability
0.010.050.100.250.500.90 1.00
R2 —(cPt/Act0t)2 0.000.00 0.01.0.060.250.81 1.00
cPted/c (%) 0.010.040.090.210.430.77 0.86
($) 0.060.320.641.613.21 5.79 6.43
1 0.00; 0.01; 0.06; 0.34; 1.38; 4.46; 5.51;
—coeff.of 2 o.ooc 0.03; o.i.1;0.69;2.76; 8.93; 11.0;
relative risk 5 o.oo; 0.07; 0.28; 1.72; 6.89; 22.3; 27.6;
aversion 10 o.oic 0.14; o.ss; 3.44;13.8;44.6; 55.1C
30 0.02 0.41; i.&sc 10.3; 41.3$1.33 $1.65
Utility costs are in dollars per quarter. The top four rows give four
measures of the assumed predictability of consumption growth or changes,
which equal the Euler error with constant interest rates. The table entries
predictable 2 are calculated as 7(tc )Ic.
35Appendix
i. Near-Rationality near an optimum.
If the objective is twice differentiable, first order deviations have




Expand f about a point x° near x. Then
af'(x°) ax +f"(x°) ax2
We can expand the derivatives around the optimum x*as well:
o * * a*
f'(x )af'(x)+f(x )(x -x)
o * * 0 *
f(x)af"(x)÷f'''(x)(x -x)
so, keeping only second order terms,
a f_(x*) (Ax (x0 -x*)+ ax2)
For fixed x°, deviations Ax have first order losses, but the ratio of losses
to deviations can be made arbitrarily small by choosing small enough regions
for x° as well as small enough Ax.
V > 0 3 6, v s.t. IxOx*J < 6 and Ax < v cal/ax< €.
Thispoint carries over to the consumer's problem.
36II. Attained Expected Utility for Linear-Quadratic Problems.
A. General Problem.
The general problem can be stated as: find
(A.l) tJ(X) —EtE$J R
where X evolves according to
(A.2) —at-i+. E(E÷1) — 0; E() —S
is a vector of state variables; the decision rule relating consumption to
state variables has been substituted in to derive (A.l) and (A.2).Either
substituting (A.2) in (A.l), or guessing a quadratic form and verifying it,
we have





(A.5) P —ft÷ A'PA
(See Sargent (1987).) Different decision rules will yield different values
for A. and hence different achieved utilitiesU(X).
B. Utility losses from excess sensitivity
For the model in equations (3.2.1) -(3.2.3)with decision rules of the
form (3.2.7), the attained level of utility is
(A.6) U —-1/2E Efl1(ct+j
-
.1—0
37Define the vector of state variables
(A.7) X —[1k z]'
where —- y.Then,consumption is
— + —— +
(A.8)
-c—rk+y
-c+m —[(y-c)r m )X
—FX.
so we may write the objective (A.6) in the form (A.l) with
(-)r(-)m(-)
(A.9) R —-1/2Fl" —-1/2r(-) r2 mr
+-—+ 2 m(y-c) mr r
Xe evolves as follows: using the laws of motion for income and capital,
(A.l0) —pz1÷
(A.ll) k+i —(l-s-r)Ic ÷
-ct
—+ (lm)z
we can write the law of motion for X in the form (A.2) with
10 0 0
(A.12) A —01 (1-rn) ,E—
00p
For this model, I will derive (3.2.14) as an analytic solution to (A.5).
The idea of the analytic solution is the following: from (A.5), form
(A.13) Vec(P) —Vec(R)+$ Vec(A'PA)
where Vec(.) creates a vector by stacking the rows of a matrix. Using
(A.l4) Vec(AB) —(IØA)Vec(B)—(B'øI)Vec(A),
we have
(A.15) Vec(P) —Vec(R)+fi (A'@A')Vec(P).
We can't quite collect terms in Vec P and invert because P is symmetric, so
only the diagonal and one off diagonal side can be chosen independently. To
remedy this problem, let M be a matrix that deletes redundant rows of Vec(P),
38and let N be a matrix that takes N Vec(P) and restores theredundant rows, so
that Vec(P) —N(H Vec(P)). Then, from (A.lS),
(A.l6) N Vec(P) —HVec(R) +fiN(A'A') (N H Vec?)
so'
(A.l7) (H Vec F) —(I-fiH(A' 0 A') N )1 H Vec(R).
Equation (A.17) can be used to calculate P and hence U —X'PX÷ 1/r Trace(P2)
for a given A R and S.





——2 a -(y-c) a
b r(-) b
c —1/2m(E-)+fi(1-nOb+pc
(A.19) d -r2 d









39And using these, we can evaluate achieved utility X'PX +l/rTrace(PE).
Since rn only enters in f in (A.20), utility losses from following a
different m evaluated at —yor —0depend only on lit Trace PS. In
turn'






a2(l+r)I* 2 *2l+r+p * —- 21(m-m) -m+
2r(1-flp)L l+r
*
Hence,the utility loss of using m rather than inis







which is equation (3.2.9) in the text.




optimaland alternate consumption are
(A.24) c—rk+y
* * — (l+r)lc1 +y1
-c1
—







Thus, we can take the state vector as
(A.25) —[1k (y-)
the matrices A, F and E are
10 1 1 1
oiN/(N-4-l) -1/(N+1) -1/(N+1)
(A.26)A— 00 1 0 0
00 1 0 0
00 0 1
00 0 0




To calculate theentriesof Table 4, I calculated P using (A.4) and then
trace P2. By using a doubling algorithm, the entries in Table 4 include 213
elements of the sum.
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tFor example, Cochrane (l988a) presents an asset pricing model derived from
firm's first order conditions.
2J economic theory of the contracting problems that prevent the emergence of
markets in the ownership of people or other institutions that could remove
the small surpluses of cyclical mis-allocation is beyond the scope of this
paper. Beyond the obvious agency questions and the unobservability of
utility (as compared to earnings), the fact that cyclical allocations ($7.50
more this quarter, $7.50 less the next) are so small compared to other
elements of individual consumption decisions is probably part of the reason
that we do not observe such institutions.
3Jones and Stock (1987) also consider this extension.
4641n a more formal presentation, we specify an underlying probability space
(O,F,P), and a nondecreasing sequence of sub a-algebras of F, s, that
comprise the consumer's information set. s can be generated by current and
past observations of a collection of observed random variables x(t).Then
the object that the consumer chooses is a sequence of random variables
c:Q 99.where each c is measurable with respect to St.
5Non-state-separable preferences (see Epstein and Zin (1987) or Kocherlakota
(1988)) are typically adopted to plausibly use a value of the coefficient of
risk aversion or intertemporal substitution around 30.Utility costs are
roughly linear in the coefficient of risk aversion, so one needs risk
aversion coefficients of 100 or so to get an order of magnitude increase in
utility costs, or $10 per quarter. On the other hand, utility functions that
include durability ("nondurable consumption" includes clothes) allow greater
variation in consumption for the same utility costs.
6The consumer's problem can often be written as a dynamicprogram,
V(k, At) —maxu(c) ÷ $EV(Rtk +y
-c,A+j)
(c
Where At is a listing of shocks. Then, the second order effects are
1 * * 2 AU a [u(c)+ $E Vkk(kt+l. A1) ]Ac
Since u(c÷1) < vkk(lct+l. At+1) < 0 the same approximate bounds follow.
Since the functional form of V is often not known, the upper bound in (3.1.4)
is easier to use for order-of-magnitude calculations.
477To derive the consumer's optimal decision rule, express the budget
constraint in present value form:
1c + t+j
— a.s.
The consumer's first order conditions (2.2) are c — ( ).Then,take
the expected value of the budget constraint, plug in the first order





(Hansen (1987) and Lichenbaum Christiano and Marshall (1988) derive similar
decision rules in more general versions of this model.)
8We can also vary the coefficient on the 1c term in the consumption decision
rule, to r+ instead of r.As long as l+r-rtl 'C1/flthe budget constraint
will be satisfied.
9Assessing whether this alternative could generate Flavin's statistical
*
rejectionis a little more subtle.Though Flavin's estimate of rn-rnwas
nearly 2 standard errors away from 0, the weight of flavin's statistical
evidence came from combined excess sensitivity to eight lags of income rather
than from contemporaneous income alone, and from the predictive power of all
eight lags of income for consumption changes. However, the excess smoothness
alternative considered here generates about the same predictability of
consumption changes (R2) as is found in a replication of flavin's regression
of consumption changes on eight lags of income, which is a more precise
indication that this alternative can account for the statistical rejection.
4810The weight of Campbell and Deaton s statistical evidence also came from
predictability of Euler equation errors rather than rejection of the optimal
innovation variance of c/y in favor of these alternatives.The excess
smoothness alternative generates predictable consumption changes (R2)larger
than those found by Campbell and Deaton, so it can also account for the
statiflical rejection.
more complex environments, for example those that include stochastic
interest rates, we can find utility costs as in the linear quadratic case, by
solving a Bellman-like equation
V(k. shocks) —u(c)+flEV(k+1,shocks+1).
after we specify the alternative decision rule relating c to k etc.
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